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CREDIT RATING AGENCIES AND THEIR POTENTIAL 






Credit rating agencies (CRAs) play a key role in financial markets by helping to reduce the 
informative asymmetry between lenders and investors, on one side, and issuers on the other 
side, about the creditworthiness of companies or countries.  CRAs' role has expanded with 
financial globalization and has received an additional boost from Basel II which incorporates 
the ratings of CRAs into the rules for setting weights for credit risk.  Ratings tend to be sticky, 
lagging markets, and overreact when they do change. This overreaction may have aggravated 
financial crises in the recent past, contributing to financial instability and cross-country 
contagion.   
 
The recent bankruptcies of Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat have prompted legislative 
scrutiny of the agencies.  Criticism has been especially directed towards the high degree of 
concentration of the industry.  Promotion of competition may require policy action at national 
and international level to encourage the establishment of new agencies and to channel 






Credit rating agencies (subsequently denoted CRAs) specialize in analysing and evaluating 
the creditworthiness of corporate and sovereign issuers of debt securities.  In the new 
financial architecture, CRAs are expected to become more important in the management of 
both corporate and sovereign credit risk. Their role has recently received a boost from the 
revision by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) of capital standards for 
banks culminating in Basel II. 
 
The logic underlying the existence of CRAs is to solve the problem of the informative 
asymmetry between lenders and borrowers regarding the creditworthiness of the latter.   
Issuers with lower credit ratings pay higher interest rates embodying larger risk premiums 
than higher rated issuers.  Moreover, ratings determine the eligibility of debt and other 
financial instruments for the portfolios of certain institutional investors due to national 
regulations that restrict investment in speculative-grade bonds. 
 
The rating agencies fall into two categories: (i) recognized; and (ii) non-recognized.  The 
former are recognized by supervisors in each country for regulatory purposes.  In the United 
States, only five CRAs of which the best known are Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 
are recognized by the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC). The majority of CRAs such 
as the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Institutional Investor (II), and Euromoney are "non-
recognized". There is a wide disparity among CRAs. They may differ in size and scope 
(geographical and sectoral) of coverage.  There are also wide differences in their 
methodologies and definitions of the default risk, which renders comparison between them 
difficult.   
   2 
Regarding their role vis-à-vis developing countries, the rating of country and sovereign is 
particularly important. As defined by Nagy (1984), "Country risk is the exposure to a loss in 
cross-border lending, caused by events in a particular country which are – at least to some 
extent – under the control of the government but definitely not under the control of a private 
enterprise or individual".  Under this definition, all forms of cross-border lending in a country 
– whether to the government, a bank, a private enterprise or an individual – are included.  
Country risk is therefore a broader concept than sovereign risk.  The latter is restricted to the 
risk of lending to the government of a sovereign nation. However, sovereign and country risks 
are highly correlated as the government is the major actor affecting both. Rare exceptions to 
the principle of the sovereign ceiling – that the debt rating of a company or bank based in a 
country cannot exceed the country’s sovereign rating – do occur. 
 
The failure of big CRAs to predict the 1997–1998 Asian crisis and the recent bankruptcies of 
Enron, WorldCom and Parmalat has raised questions concerning the rating process and the 
accountability of CRAs and has prompted legislators to scrutinize rating agencies. This report 
gives an overview of the sovereign credit rating industry: (i) analyses its impact on 
developing countries; and (ii) assesses some of the CRAs' shortcomings in the context of 
concerns that have recently been raised.  
 
 
II. CREDIT RATING AGENCIES  IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
 
A.  Asymmetry of information and CRAs as "opinion" makers 
 
A credit rating compresses a large variety of information that needs to be known about the 
creditworthiness of the issuer of bonds and certain other financial instruments.  The CRAs 
thus contribute to solving principal agent problems by helping lenders "pierce the fog of 




CRAs stress that their ratings constitute opinions. They are not a recommendation to buy, sell 
or hold a security and do not address the suitability of an investment for an investor. Ratings 
have an impact on issuers via various regulatory schemes by determining the conditions and 
the costs under which they access debt markets. Regulators have outsourced to CRAs much of 
the responsibility for assessing debt risk. For investors, ratings are a screening tool that 
influences the composition of their portfolios as well as their investment decisions.  
 
B.  Credit ratings and Basel II 
 
Regulatory changes in banks’ capital requirements under Basel II have resulted in a new role 
to credit ratings.  Ratings can be used to assign the risk weights determining minimum capital 
charges for different categories of borrower. Under the Standardized Approach to credit risk, 
Basel II establishes credit risk weights for each supervisory category which rely on "external 
credit assessments" (see box 1). Moreover, credit ratings are also used for assessing risks in 




1 White (2001: 4).   3
 
 
The importance of ratings-based regulations is particularly visible in the United States, where 
it can be traced back to the 1930s.  These regulations not only affect banks but also insurers, 
pension funds, mutual funds and brokers by restricting or prohibiting the purchase of bonds 
with "low" ratings. Examples are: (i) non-investment grade or speculative-grade ratings 
easing the issuance conditions or disclosure requirements for securities carrying a 
"satisfactory" rating; and (ii) an investment-grade rating.
2  While ratings-based regulations are 
less common in Europe, they are part of the new Capital Requirements Directive through the 
EU that will implement Basel II. 
 
                                                       
2 The major CRAs have their own rating schemes which differ for different categories of debt:  long-
and short-term; bank- and non-bank and in the case of Fitch’s ratings for banks include the likelihood 
of external support, should this become necessary to enable them to continue meeting their financial 
obligations on a timely basis. The best known ratings are those of Moody's and Standard and Poor’s for 
long-term debt, which vary between AAA and BBB for investment grade for Standard and Poor’s 
(Aaa-Baa3 for Moody’s) and  between BB+ and  CC for speculative grade for Standard and Poor’s 
(Ba1-C for Moody’s). For more details see table 1 of annex 2. 
Box 1: Basel II 
 
The major objective of Basel II is to revise the rules of the 1988 Basel Capital Accord in such a way 
as to align banks’ regulatory capital more closely with their risks, taking account of progress in the 
measurement and management of these risks and the opportunities which these provide for 
strengthened supervision. Under Pillar 1 of Basel II, regulatory capital requirements for credit risk 
are calculated according to two alternative approaches: (i) the Standardized Approach; and (ii) the 
Internal Ratings-Based Approach. Under the Standardised Approach (SA) the measurement of 
credit risk is based on external credit assessments provided by External Credit Assessment 
Institutions (ECAIs) such as credit rating agencies or export credit agencies. Under the Internal 
Ratings-Based Approach (IRBA), subject to supervisory approval as to the satisfaction of certain 
conditions, banks use their own rating systems to measure some or all of the determinants of credit 
risk. Under the Foundation Version (FV), banks calculate the Probability of Default (PD) on the 
basis of their own ratings but rely on their supervisors for measures of the other determinants of 
credit risk. Under the Advanced Version (AV), banks also estimate their own measures of all the 
determinants of credit risk, including Loss Given Default (LGD) and Exposure at Default (EAD).  
 
Under the regulatory capital requirements for operational risk, there are three options of 
progressively greater sophistication: (i) under the Basic Indicator Approach (BIA), the capital 
charge is a percentage of banks' gross income; (ii) under the Standardized Approach (SA), the 
capital charge is the sum of specified percentages of banks' gross income from eight business lines 
(or alternatively for two of these business lines, retail and commercial banking, of different 
percentages of loans and advances) and (iii) under the Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA), 
subject to the satisfaction of more stringent supervisory criteria, banks estimate the required capital 
with their own internal systems for measuring operational risk. 
 
Pillars 2 and 3 of Basel II are concerned with supervisory review of capital adequacy and the 
achievement of market discipline through disclosure. 
 
Source:  Various writers such as Reisen (2002), have expressed the view that the Basel II Accord 
may destabilize private capital flows to developing countries. This would be true if the closer links 
under Basel II between the levels of banks’ regulatory capital and their assessment of credit risks 
accentuated pro-cyclical fluctuations in their lending. Moreover, the same link may also result in 
higher interest rates than under the 1988 Accord for less creditworthy developing country 
borrowers. The ratings of CRAs may contribute to unfavourable effects under both headings. As 
discussed below, changes in these ratings sometimes follow closely cyclical changes in economic 
conditions. Moreover, owing to their low credit ratings, certain developing countries may be 
assigned higher weights for credit risk than under 1988 Capital Accord and thus be charged higher 
rates of interest on their borrowing.    
   4 
 
III. CREDIT RATING AGENCIES’ PROCEDURES AND METHODS 
A.   Quantitative and qualitative methods 
 
The processes and methods used to establish credit ratings vary widely among CRAs. 
Traditionally, CRAs have relied on a process based on a quantitative and qualitative 
assessment reviewed and finalized by a rating committee. More recently, there has been 
increased reliance on quantitative statistical models based on publicly available data with the 
result that the assessment process is more mechanical and involves less reliance on 
confidential information.  No single model outperforms all the others.  Performance is heavily 
influenced by circumstances. 
 
A sovereign rating is aimed at "measuring the risk that a government may default on its own 
obligations in either local or foreign currency. It takes into account both the ability and 
willingness of a government to repay its debt in a timely manner.
3"  The key measure in credit 
risk models is the measure of the Probability of Default (PD) but exposure is also determined 
by the expected timing of default and by the Recovery Rate (RE) after default has occurred:  
 
•  Standard and Poor's ratings seek to capture only the forward-looking probability of the 
occurrence of default. They provide no assessment of the expected time of default or 
mode of default resolution and recovery values; 
•  By contrast, Moody's ratings focus on the Expected Loss (EL) which is a function of 
both Probability of Default (PD) and the expected Recovery Rate (RE).  Thus EL = 
PD (1- RE); and 
•  Fitch's ratings also focus on both PD and RE (Bhatia, 2002).  They have a more 
explicitly hybrid character in that analysts are also reminded to be forward-looking 
and to be alert to possible discontinuities between past track records and future trends.   
 
The credit ratings of Moody's and Standard and Poor's are assigned by rating committees and 
not by individual analysts. There is a large dose of judgement in the committees’ final ratings.  
CRAs provide little guidance as to how they assign relative weights to each factor, though 
they do provide information on what variables they consider in determining sovereign ratings.  
Identifying the relationship between the CRAs' criteria and actual ratings is difficult, in part 
because some of the criteria used are neither quantitative nor quantifiable but qualitative. The 
analytical variables are interrelated and the weights are not fixed either across sovereigns or 
over time.  Even for quantifiable factors, determining relative weights is difficult because the 
agencies rely on a large number of criteria and there is no formula for combining the scores to 
determine ratings. 
 
In assessing sovereign risk, CRAs highlight several risk parameters of varying importance: 
(i) economic; (ii) political; (iii) fiscal and monetary flexibility; and (iv) the debt burden (see 
box 2).  Economic risk addresses the ability to repay its obligations on time and is a function 
of both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Political risk addresses the sovereign's 
willingness to repay debt. Willingness to pay is a qualitative issue that distinguishes 
sovereigns from most other types of issuers. Partly because creditors have only limited legal 
redress, a government can (and sometimes does) default selectively on its obligations, even 
when it possesses the financial capacity for debt service. In practice, political risk and 
economic risk are related. A government that is unwilling to repay debt is usually pursuing 
economic policies that weaken its ability to do so. Willingness to pay, therefore, encompasses 
the range of economic and political factors influencing government policy (see box 2). 
                                                       
3 Moody's special comment (August 2006:1). "A Guide to Moody's Sovereign Ratings". 
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Box 2:  Standard and Poor's sovereign ratings methodology profile 
 
Political risk 
•  Stability and legitimacy of political institutions; 
•  Popular participation in political processes; 
•  Orderliness of leadership successions; 
•  Transparency in economic policy decisions and objectives; 
•  Public security; and 
•  Geopolitical risk. 
Income and economic structure 
•  Prosperity, diversity and degree to which economy is market-oriented; 
•  Income disparities; 
•  Effectiveness of financial sector in intermediating funs availability of credit; 
•  Competitiveness and profitability of non-financial private sector; 
•  Efficiency of public sector; 
•  Protectionism and other non-market influences; and 
•  Labour flexibility. 
Economic growth prospects 
•  Size and composition of savings and investment; and 
•  Rate and pattern of economic growth. 
Fiscal flexibility 
•  General government revenue, expenditure, and surplus/deficit trends; 
•  Revenue-raising flexibility and efficiency; 
•  Expenditure effectiveness and pressures; 
•  Timeliness, coverage and transparency in reporting; and 
•  Pension obligations. 
General government burden 
•  General government gross and net (of assets) debt as a per cent of GDP; 
•  Share of revenue devoted to interest; 
•  Currency composition and maturity profile; and 
•  Depth and breadth of local capital markets. 
Offshore and contingent liabilities 
•  Size and health of NFPEs; and 
•  Robustness of financial sector. 
Monetary flexibility 
•  Price behaviour  in economic cycles; 
•  Money and credit expansion; 
•  Compatibility of exchange rate regime and monetary goals; 
•  Institutional factors such as central bank independence; and 
•  Range and efficiency of monetary goals. 
External liquidity 
•  Impact of fiscal and monetary policies on external accounts; 
•  Structure of the current account; 
•  Composition of capital flows; and 
•  Reserve adequacy. 
External debt burden 
•  Gross and net external debt, including deposits and structured debt; 
•  Maturity profile, currency composition, and sensitivity to interest rate changes; 
•  Access to concessional lending; and 
•  Debt service burden. 
. 
Source: Standard and Poor's  (October 2006). “Sovereign Credit Ratings: A Primer. 
Notes:   NFPEs: Non-Financial Public Sector Enterprises.   6 
Broadly speaking, the economic variables aim at measuring three types of performance: 
(i) measures of domestic economic performance; (ii) measures of a country's external position 
and its ability to service its external obligations; and (iii) the influence of external 
developments. Bhatia (2002), notes that CRAs’ analyses prior to the Asian financial crisis 
focused on traditional macroeconomic indicators with limited emphasis on contingent liability 
and international liquidity considerations. Moreover, private sector weaknesses were not 
included in the analyses of sovereign rating. 
 
In practice, a small number of variables such as: (i) GDP per capita; (ii) real GDP growth per 
capita; (iii) the Consumer Price Index (CPI); (iv) the ratio of government fiscal balance to 
GDP; and (v) government debt to GDP have a large impact on credit ratings. The relationship 
between these indicators and Standard and Poor's ratings are illustrated in figures 1-5 of 
Annex 1.  By and large: (i) higher GDP per capita leads to higher ratings; higher CPI inflation 
to lower ratings, the lower the rating, the lower the government balance as a ratio to GDP; and 
(ii) higher fiscal deficits and government debt in relation to GDP to lower ratings. 
 
 
B.   Empirical assessments of credit rating determinants 
 
A number of economists have estimated econometrically the determinants of credit ratings for 
both mature and emerging markets (Cantor and Packer, 1995, 1996;   Haque  et  al.,  1996, 
1997; Reisen and von Maltzan 1999; Juttner and McCarthy, 2000; and Bhatia, 2002).  In these 
studies, a small number of variables explain 90 per cent of the variation in the ratings: 
 
•  GDP per capita; 
•  GDP Growth; 
•  Inflation; 
•  The ratio of non-gold foreign exchange reserves to imports; 
•  The ratio of the current account balance to GDP; and 
•  Default history and the level of economic development. 
 
Indeed, a single variable GDP per capita, explains about 80 per cent of the variation in ratings 
(Borenszstein and Panizza, 2006). It is worth noting that the fiscal position, measured by the 
average annual central government budget deficit/surplus ratio to GDP, in the three years 
before the rating year and the external position measured by the average annual current 
account deficit/surplus in relation to GDP, in the three years before the rating year, were 
found to be statistically insignificant. 
 
While including political events can improve the explanatory power of the regressions, the 
exclusion of political variables does not bias the parameter estimates (Haque et al., 1996; 
Cantor and Packer, 1996). In addition, for developing country ratings, two other variables 
adversely affected ratings independently of domestic economic fundamentals (Haque et al., 
1996, 1997): 
 
•  Increases in international interest rates; and 
•  The structure of its exports and its concentration. 
 
Jüttner and McCarthy (2000), found a structural break in ratings assessment in 1997 in the 
wake of the South-East Asian crisis. "Econometric estimates may convey wrong or 
meaningless signals to investors during a rating crisis, there is no set model or framework 
for judgement which are capable of explaining the variations in assignment of sovereign 
ratings over time
4".  The authors add in a footnote that this means that in a global financial 
                                                       
4 Jüttner and McCarthy (2000: 2- 22).   7
crisis ratings, models might become completely obsolete since a stable relationship between 
rating and their determinants might be impossible to identify.   
 
In their analysis of the determinant of ratings during the the Asian crisis, Jüttner and 
McCarthy found that the following variables were significant: 
 
•  The CPI; 
•  The ratio of external debt to exports;  
•  A dummy default history;  
•  The interest rate differential; and  
•  The real exchange rate. 
 
Neither the interest rate differential nor the real exchange rate were found to be significant 
determinants prior to the Asian crisis thus indicating that these variables may have been 
overlooked by the agencies before the crisis.  Variables denoting financial strength were not 
found to be significant determinants of sovereign ratings even one year after the Asian crisis. 
However, these variables were subsequently included in ratings assessments by the major 
CRAs following their unsatisfactory performance during Asian crisis. 
 
 
C.  Rating differences, notching, solicited and unsolicited ratings 
 
Although CRAs have different concepts and measurements of the probability of default, 
various studies which have compared Moody's and Standard and Poor's ratings, have found a 
great similarity for investment grade ratings (Cantor and Packer, 1996; Ammer and Packer, 
2000).  In the case of speculative-grade issues, Moody's and Standard and Poor's assign 
divergent ratings much more frequently to sovereign bonds than to corporate bonds.  The 
literature also finds clear evidence of differences in rating scales once we move beyond the 
two largest agencies.  For example, ratings for the same issuer tend to be lower for the two 
largest agencies than for other agencies such as Fitch, Duff and Phelps.
5   
 
Some of these differences can be explained by sample selection bias.  The analysis of (Cantor 
and Packer, 1997) points to only limited evidence of significant selection bias and significant 
evidence for differences in rating scales between larger and small CRAs. Regardless of rating 
differences, the market appears to reward issuers with a lower interest costs when a third 
rating is assigned, especially when the rating is higher (BCBS, 2000).   
 
Fitch and the Egan-Jones Rating Companies have accused the big two CRAs of practising the 
"notching", a practice whereby Moody's and Standard and Poor's  would initiate an automatic 
downward of structured securities, if the two agencies were not hired to rate them (Egan-
Jones Ratings Company, 2002). Moody's response to Fitch's accusations is that unsolicited 
ratings usually result in a lower rating for debt securities because of either lack of information 
or the use of different methodologies to determine the probability of default.   
 
Unsolicited ratings raise potential conflict of interests. Both Moody's and Standard and Poor's 
state that they reserve the right to rate and make public ratings for United States SEC-
registered corporate bonds, whether or not requested by an issuer.  If the issuer does not 
request the rating, the rating will simply be based on publicly available information.  If the 
issuer requests the rating, then it provides information to the rating agency and pays the fees.  
Many new entrants in the credit rating industry issue unsolicited ratings to gain credibility in 
the market. Some issuers have accused CRAs of using unsolicited ratings and the threat of 
                                                       
5 The credit rating business of Duff and Phelps was merged to Fitch's in 1994.   8 




Since 2001, Moody's claims that it has not done any unsolicited rating in Europe.  Standard 
and Poor's also claims not to do any unsolicited rating outside the United States. As 
unsolicited ratings are based on public information and thus lack issuer input, the issue of 
unsolicited ratings could be addressed by requiring CRAs to disclose whether it has been 
solicited or not.  Both Moody's and Standard and Poor's already specify in their ratings 
whether the ratings have been solicited and give issuers the opportunity to participate at any 
stage of  the process, if they wish. 
 
 
IV. IMPACT OF RATINGS 
 
A.  Costs and benefits of obtaining a rating 
 
As mentioned earlier, the primary purpose of obtaining a rating is to enhance access to private 
capital markets and lower debt issuance and interest costs. Theoretical work (Ramakrishnan 
and Thakor, 1984; Millon and Thakor, 1985) suggests that credit rating agencies, in their role 
as information gatherers and processors, can reduce a firm's capital costs by certifying its 
value in a market, thus solving or reducing the informative asymmetries between purchasers 
and issuers.  For sovereign borrowers, there is evidence of a clear correlation between bond 





Bond spreads by ratings 
 
 
Source:   BIS Quarterly Review, JPMorgan Chase and EMBI Global Diversified 




6SEC (Concept Release nos. 33-8236; 34-47972 and IC-26066). Rating agencies and the use of Credit 
Ratings under the Federal Securities Laws. 
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There are other indirect benefits from ratings for low income countries, namely: (i) to foster 
FDI; and (ii) to promote more vibrant local capital markets greater public sector financial 
transparency"
7.  As a result, even some sovereigns that do not intend to issue cross-border 
debt in the immediate future are seeking credit ratings from CRAs. 
 
For emerging markets, there is an important externality of obtaining a rating, that of the 
"sovereign ceiling" effect. Borenzstein et al., (2006), find that, although it has been relaxed 
since 1997, the effect of the sovereign ceiling remains statistically highly significant, 
especially for bank corporations, being more important for banks that reside in countries with 
a high level of sovereign debt and smaller for banks with strong foreign parents. 
 
 
B.  Booms and busts: financial crises in emerging markets and the pro-cyclicality of 
ratings 
 
The 1997–1998, Asian crisis highlighted CRAs’ potential for reinforcing booms-and-busts of 
capital flows. As ratings lagged, instead of leading market events and over reacted during 
both the pre-and post-crisis periods, they may have helped to amplify these cycles.  Other 
evidence points in the same direction. 
 
Several empirical studies show that sovereign ratings are sticky, lagging market sentiment and 
overreacting with a lag to economic conditions and business cycles.  (Larrain et al., 1997; 
Reisen and von Maltzan, 1997) have found that ratings are correlated with sovereign bond 
yield spreads.  In the aftermath of the 1994–1995 Mexican crisis, the authors find a two–way 
causality between sovereign ratings and market spreads.  Not only do international capital 
markets react to changes in the ratings, but the ratings systematically respond, with a lag to 
market conditions as reflected in the sovereign bond yield spreads. This study also indicates a 
highly significant announcement effect when emerging markets sovereign bonds are put on 
review with negative outlook.  Moreover, the study finds a significant negative effect of rating 
announcements following a rating downgrade, investors need to readjust their portfolios. 
Positive rating announcements, by contrast, do not seem to have a significant effect on bond 
spreads.  
 
Moody's more recent 2003 report on pro-cyclicality claims that the relative stability of credit 
ratings compared to market-based indicators suggests that ratings were more likely to dampen 
rather than to amplify the  credit cycle, and that most rating changes reflected long lasting 
changes in fundamental credit risk rather than temporary cyclical developments. The 
relationship between credit ratings and the cyclicality –and thus the impact of changes in the 
CRAs’ practices in response to shortcomings revealed by the crises of the 1990s – thus 
remains an open empirical question.  
 
 
C.  Accuracy and performance of ratings 
 
CRAs’ failure to predict the Mexican and Asian financial crises was due, among other things, 
to the fact that contingent liability and international liquidity considerations had not been 
taken into account by CRAs. Concerning the Asian crisis, Moody's acknowledged that it had 
been confronted with a new set of circumstances requiring a paradigm shift in the following 
areas: 
•  Greater analytic emphasis on the risks of short-term debt for otherwise creditworthy 
countries; 
                                                       
7 Standard and Poor's and David B (2004). "Credit FAQ: The Future of Sovereign Credit Ratings", 
London.   10 
•  Greater emphasis on the identity and creditworthiness of a country’s short-term 
borrowers; 
•   Greater appreciation of the risks posed by a weak banking system;  
•  Greater attention to the identity and likely behaviour of foreign short-term creditors; 
and  
•  Increased sensitivity to the risk that a financial crisis in one country can lead to 
contagion effects for other countries. 
 
A balance has to be found in the trade-off between accuracy and stability. Rating agencies are 
averse to reversing ratings within a short period of time.  Both Moody's and Standard and 
Poor's intend their ratings to be stable measures of relative credit risk. Moody's claims that 
this corresponds to issuers' as well as institutional investors' wishes and that its "desire for 
stable ratings reflects the view that more stable ratings are 'better' ratings".  
 
An economist argues that measured "failures" are based on ratings stability (Bhatia, 2002). 
With exceptions for some of the lowest ratings, he defines a "failed rating" as one that is 
lowered or raised by "three or more notches within 12 months". The choice of three notches is 
related to the small probability of a three notch rating change among CRAs. Applying the 
Bhatia definition of rating failure to the long-term foreign currency sovereign ratings of 
Moody's and Standard and Poor's in 1997–2002, shows that Moody's and Standard and Poor's 
both experienced failures during the Asian crisis; Standard and Poor's failed also during the 
Russian and Argentinean crisis; and Moody’s failed during the Russian but not the 
Argentinean crisis (see table below). Bhatia's failure definition suggests that rating failures 
was less prevalent in 1999–2002 than in 1997–1998.  
 
















S&P        
1997: Thailand  A ( 3 Sep. 1997)  BBB- (8 Jan. 1998)  4↓ (0.97)  Evaporation of reserves 
1997: Indonesia  BBB (10 Oct. 1997)  B- (11 Mar. 1998)  7↓ (1.40)  Collapse of asset quality 
1997: Rep. of Korea  AA- (24 Oct. 1997)  B+ (22 Dec. 1997)       10↓ (5.26)  Evaporation of reserves 
1997: Malaysia  A+ (23 Dec. 1997)  BBB- (15 Sep. 1998)         5↓ (0.57)  Collapse of asset quality 
1998:Rep. of Korea   B+ (18 Feb. 1998)  BBB- (25 Jan. 1999)         4↑ (0.36  Reserves replenishment 
1998: Romania  BB- (20 May 1998)  B- (19 Oct. 1998)  3↓ (0.61)  Evaporation of reserves 
1998: Russian Federation  BB- (9 June 1998)  B- (13 Aug. 1998)  3↓ (1.43)  Evaporation of reserves 
2000: Argentina   BB (14 Nov. 2000)  B- (12 July 2001)  4↓ (0.50)  Fiscal slippage 
2002. Uruguay  BBB- (14 Feb. 2002)  B (26 July 2002)  5↓ (0.94)  Evaporation of reserves 
Moody's        
1997: Thailand  A2 (8 Apr. 1997)  Bal (21 Dec. 1997)  5↓ (0.68)  Evaporation of reserves 
1997:Rep. of Korea  A1 (27 Nov. 1997)  Bal (21 Dec. 1997)  6↓ (7.83)  Evaporation of reserves 
1997: Indonesia  Baa3 (21 Dec. 1997)  B3 (20 Mar. 1998)  6↓ (2.05)  Collapse of asset quality 
1997: Malaysia  A1 (21 Dec. 1997  Baa2 (14 Sep. 1998)  4↓ (0.46)  Collapse of asset quality 
1998:Russian Federation  Ba2 (11 Mar. 1998)  B3 (21 Aug. 1998)  4↓ (0.75)  Evaporation of reserves 
1998:Moldovia  Ba2 ( 14 July 1998)  B2 (14 July 1998)        3↓ (90.00)  Evaporation of reserves 
1998:Romania  Ba3 (14 Sep. 1998)  B3 (6 Nov. 1998)  3↓ (1.76)  Evaporation of reserves 
2002: Uruguay  Baa3 (3 May 2002)  B3 (31 July 2002)  6↓ (2.07)  Evaporation of reserves 
        
 
 
Source: Bhatia (2002: box 5). 
Notes:  1/  Ratings failure defined by successive downgrades or upgrades of a long-term foreign 
  currency sovereign rating by three or more notches in aggregate during any rolling 12-
  month period, excluding downgrades or upgrades into, out of , within, or between the 
  ratings categories from "CCC" or "Caa" downward.  Based on ratings activity up to-
  end July 2002, coverage of failures from August 2001 on is therefore partial. 
  2/  Refers to a long-term foreign currency sovereign rating. 
  3/  Notches of ratings downgrades (↓) or  upgrades (↑).  Figures in parentheses capture 
  the speed of adjustment, in notches per month (notches of adjustment divided by the 
  number of months from start to end of the corrective sequence).    11
In response to criticism concerning such failures, Moody's has introduced watchlist and 
Standard and Poor's outlook reports to alleviate the tension between accuracy and stability by 
providing timely warnings of likely rating changes.  
 
Ratings performance can also be compared with market indicators. (IMF,1999) conducted an 
analysis of yield spreads in relation to the Asian crisis and found that one year ahead of the 
crisis in Thailand, Indonesia and the Republic of Korea, sovereign spreads were quite low – 
of the order of 100–150 basis points. In the Russian Federation and Brazil, they were higher – 
about 300 basis points. Thus, in relative terms, the markets were in broad agreement with the 
CRAs with respect to these countries, indicating a higher risk of default for the Russian 
Federation and Brazil than for the Asian countries.  Moreover, spreads did not widen much 
initially in response to the onset of the Asian crisis, a pattern conforming to that of the ratings. 
Thus the performance of financial markets broadly paralleled that of the major CRAs. 
 
 
D.   Impact of ratings on policies pursued by borrowing countries 
 
For borrowing countries, a rating downgrade has negative effects on their access to credit and 
the cost of their borrowing (Cantor and Packer, 1996). Although precise information is not 
available on the way in which macroeconomic policies are taken into consideration by CRAs 
in establishing sovereign ratings, it is reasonable to assume that orthodox policies focusing on 
the reduction of inflation and government budget deficits are favoured.  There is a risk, 
therefore, that in order to avoid rating downgrades, borrowing countries adopt policies that 
address the short-term concerns of portfolio investors, even when they are in conflict with 
long-term development needs. However, this is an issue which has not been the subject of 
systematic research.  
 
 
V. PUBLIC POLICY CONCERNS 
 
A.  Recent regulatory initiatives  
 
In view of the critical role played by CRAs in the modern financial architecture, policy-
makers have recently focused on some shortcomings arising from the following concerns: 
 
•  Barriers to entry and lack of competition; 
•  Conflicts of interest; 
•  Transparency; and 
•  Accountability. 
 
These concerns have been raised by the International Organization of Securities Commission, 
(IOSCO), the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, (SEC), the European 
Commission Committee of European Securities Regulations, (CESR), and by the United 
States Congress and Senate. 
 
On the basis of Section 702 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the United States Congress 
mandated the SEC to issue a "Report on the Role and Function of Credit Rating Agencies" in 
the operation of the Securities Markets. This was to address several issues pertaining to the 
current role and functioning of CRAs including the information flow in the credit-rating 
process, barriers to entry artificially created by the Nationally Recognized Statistically Rating 
Organizations (NRSRO) designation in the United States and conflicts of interest or abusive 
practices.      
   12 
A review of the concept of NRSRO was already underway at the SEC. In June 2003, the SEC 
issued a Concept Release seeking comments with respect to whether CRAs’ ratings should 
continue to be used for regulatory purposes, and if so, whether the NRSRO certification 
procedure was appropriate as well as more generally what should be the adequate level of 
regulatory oversight for CRAs. In April 2005, the SEC released a "Proposed Rule" aiming at 
insuring a higher level of transparency with respect to the NRSRO concept. 
 
The technical committee of the IOSCO issued three reports in September 2003: (i) Report on 
the Activities of Credit Rating Agencies; (ii) Statement of Principles Regarding the Activities 
of Credit Rating Agencies; and (iii) Report on Analyst of Conflict of Interest. These reports 
highlighted the important role CRAs play in financial markets, and aimed at ensuring greater 
reliability for their ratings. In December 2004, the IOSCO published its Code of Conduct 
Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies (the IOSCO Code) which aimed at developing 
"governance rules" for CRAs to ensure: (i) quality and integrity of the rating process; (ii) 
independence of the process and avoidance of conflict of interests; and (iii) greater 
transparency in the methodology of ratings and adequate treatment of confidential 
information. However, the IOSCO Code did not address the issue of enforcement of the Code, 
recommending that CRAs adopt these rules voluntarily.  
 
In response to IOSCO's Code of Professional Conduct, Moody's and Standard and Poor's 
published their own Code of Professional conduct in the second half of 2005, thus aligning 
their policies and procedures with IOSCO's Code.  In the spring of 2006, Moody's and 
Standard and Poor's published their first report on the implementation of the Code of conduct.  
Here, it was stated that, even before the SEC and IOSCO had recommended new rules of 
conduct in 2003, the two agencies had already established internal codes of conduct and 
procedures to prevent and manage potential conflict of interests and to safeguard the 
independence and objectivity of their rating processes. 
 
Consideration of the issues related to CRAs by the United States Congress eventually 
culminated in the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act which was signed into law in early 
September 2006. This amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to redefine an NRSRO 
as any CRA that has been in business for at least three consecutive years and is registered 
under the Act. It also prescribed procedural requirements for mandatory NRSRO registration 
and certification. It granted the SEC exclusive enforcement authority over any NRSRO and 
authorized the SEC: (i) to take action against an NRSRO that issued credit ratings in 
contravention of procedures, criteria and methodologies included in its registration 
application; and (ii) to censure, limit, suspend or revoke the registration of an NRSRO for 
violations of the Act.  
 
In the European Union, the Enron and Parmalat breakdowns prompted discussions on CRA 
reliability. In response to a call by Commission for Advice, the CESR released in March 2005 
"CESRs" Technical Advice to the European Commission on possible Measures Concerning 
Credit Rating Agencies. 
 
 
B.  Issues of concern 
 
1.  Barriers to entry and lack of competition 
 
In the United States, there are only 5 CRAs designated by the SEC as NRSROs: (i) A.M. 
Best.; (ii) Dominion Bond Rating Service (DBRS); (iii) Fitch; (iv) Moody's Investors Service; 
and (v) the Standard and Poor's Division of McGraw Hill.  A.M. Best is a global agency 
which rates the debt only of insurance companies. DBRS is Canadian-based with a regional 
scope and the only non-US NRSRO designated agency. Thus, the number of global NRSROs 
providing a comprehensive service in the United States are three, of which two agencies,   13
Moody’s and  Standard and Poor's control over 80 per cent of the market. The mean number 
of CRAs recognized among the BCBS' member countries is around six and there are between 
130–150 credit rating agencies in the world. However, only a small number of CRAs are 
recognized internationally and the number has not changed much since the 1970s (BCBS, 
2000). 
 
According to the United States Department of Justice, the NRSRO designation has acted as a 
barrier to entry in a catch-22 manner.
8 A new rating agency cannot obtain national recognition 
without NRSRO status and it cannot obtain NRSRO status without national recognition.  In 
the words of the Rapid Ratings testimony before the Committee on Financial Services
9, "the 
effect of this catch-22 has been to preserve a duopoly that has thwarted competition and 
innovation". 
 
In an effort to increase competition and improve the quality of credit ratings, Representative 
Fitzpatrick introduced H.R. 2990, The Credit Rating Agency Duopoly Relief Act of 2005.  He 
believed that the SEC-NRSRO designation constituted an "insurmountable and artificial 
barrier to entry".  Lack of competition in the industry has led to inflated prices, stifled 
innovation, lower quality of ratings, and unchecked conflict of interests and anti-competitive 
practices
10. This bill was the basis of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 (see 
above).   
 
In its 2005 report to the European Commission mentioned above, the CESR also stated that 
new CRAs face a number of barriers to entry and existing CRAs face a number of natural 
barriers to expansion. Issuers usually only desire ratings from those CRAs that are respected 
by investors and which tend to be only those with a long performance record
11. The CESR 
report concluded that "the impact of regulatory requirements on competition is not clear and 
therefore it cannot conclude that any regulatory requirements would either increase or 
decrease the entry barriers to the rating industry. Thus CESR does not recommend the use of 
regulatory requirements as a measure to reduce or remove entry barriers to the market for 
credit ratings."
12  The CESR recommended a "wait and see" attitude and implementation of 
IOSCO's Code. 
 
In a response to such initiatives, Moody's stated that it "has supported eliminating regulatory 
barriers to entry". But, with regard to competition issues, Moody's argues that the "costly 
nature of executive time" would not allow issuers to have many different ratings. Because of 
network externalities, only a small number of CRAs would be favoured by investors, who 
would desire "consistency and comparability in credit opinions". Newly established CRAs 
would need time to gain credibility in the market. 
 
Standard and Poor's also recommended its support to "a more open and transparent process to 
designate NRSROs reduce barriers to entry and ensure that the markets remain the ultimate 
judge of the rating process"
13.  However, Standard and Poor's did not believe that the whole 




9 H.R. (2990:8). The Credit Rating Agency Duopoly Relief Act of 29 November 2005, 
http://www.rapidratings.com/press_releases/2005nov_Credit_rating_testimony_press_release_rapid_rat
ings_corporate_credit_rating_agency.pdf. 
10 H.R. (2990:4-5). The Credit Rating Agency Duopoly Relief Act of  29  November 2005, Serial No. 
109-66. 
11 CESR (2005: paras. 247-248). 
12 Ibid (para. 252). 
13 Standard and Poor's (July 2003: Press Release). S&P Supports a New More Transparent NRSRO 
Designation Process. 
14 Ibid, Standard and Poor's (July 2003: Press Release).   14 
2.  Potential conflict of interests 
 
In its September 2003 "Report of Analyst Conflict of Interests", IOSCO highlighted potential 
conflict of interests facing the industry that can interfere with the independence and 
objectivity of its analysis. Conflict of interests may arise when a rating agency offers 
consulting or other advisory services to issuers it rates since issuers could be unduly pressured 
to purchase advisory services in return for an improved rating. The report also drew attention 
to the issue of "notching" by CRAs, i.e. lowering ratings for issues which they had not rated, 
and that of "'solicited" versus "unsolicited" ratings, where aggressive tactics might be used to 
induce payments for a rating an issuer did not request. 
 
The IOSCO Code addresses the first of these issues with the following recommendation: (i) 
the credit rating, a CRA assigns to an issuer or security should not be affected by the 
existence of a potential business relationship between the CRA (or its affiliates); and (ii) the 
issuer (or its affiliates) or any other party, or the non-existence of such a relationship."
15  This 
principle has been integrated into Moody's and Standard and Poor's own Codes of 
Professional Conduct.   
3. Transparency   
 
Many market participants have expressed concern over the lack of transparency over CRAs’ 
ratings methodologies, procedures, practices and processes.  In this context, the IOSCO Code 
stresses the following in order to promote transparency and improve the ability of market 
participants and regulators to judge whether a CRA has satisfactorily implemented the Code 
Fundamentals: (i) CRAs should disclose how each provision of the Code Fundamentals is 
addressed in the CRA’s own Code of Conduct; and (ii) CRAs should explain if and how their 
own Code of Conduct deviate from the Code Fundamentals and how such deviations 
nonetheless achieve the objectives laid out in the Code Fundamentals and the IOSCO-CRA 
principles. This will permit market participants and regulators to draw their own conclusions 
about whether the CRA has implemented the Code Fundamentals to their satisfaction, and to 
react accordingly.
16   
 
IOSCO requires the CRAs' methodologies to become public to enhance transparency in an 
industry which is very opaque in nature. "CESR goes further and proposes, as an alternative 
to self-regulation, the need to introduce some specific rules on fair representation which 
would establish a minimum level of disclosure on those elements and assumptions which 
make clear for market operators and investors to understand how a specific rating was 
determined by a credit rating agency"
17. 
 
The nature and extent of information made available to the public still varies from agency to 
agency. Since the publication of the IOSCO Code and its integration into the CRAs' own 
Code of Conduct, the CRAs have increased the number of lengthy research reports and 
publications on their web sites and published some of the criteria used to assess credit risk in 
their bid  to improve transparency.  However, the view is still widespread that CRAs' 
methodologies, the variables and weights which they employ, and the criteria used in the 
deliberations of rating committees remain opaque to both investors and borrowers. The CESR 
summed up the continuing problem when it stated that: "Credit rating agencies should aim for 
transparency as the best way forward to enable investors and issuers to understand the quality 
and objectivity of the credit rating. Credit rating agencies should therefore implement 
measure 2.7 of the IOSCO Code". 
                                                       
15 IOSCO Code (Section 2: para. 2.2). 
16 IOSCO Code (2004, Introduction:  2). 
17 CESR (2005: para. 117).   15
4. Accountability 
 
There is no mechanism to protect investors and/or borrowers from mistakes made by CRAs or 
any abuse of power on their part. This is true even if reputable interests and competition 
provide incentives for generating quality financial information.  In order to promote 
transparency and improve the ability of market participants and regulators, to judge whether a 
CRA has satisfactorily implemented what it pledges it is doing, the IOSCO Code recommends 
only that CRAs give full effect to the Code by publishing their own, adhering to it and 
justifying publicly any deviation between this code and their activities. 
 
There remains the need for more formal regulation to address market failures in the form of 
imperfect competition and principal-agent problems in the credit rating industry.  The CESR 
technical report clearly puts its finger on the issue involved here: "The reason for having a 
regulatory mechanism should rather be that there exists some market failure that has to be 
dealt with.  In essence, all the issues discussed in the previous chapter arise, because of the 
existence of conflict of interests between the CRAs and the issuers and/or the users of ratings 
(the investors). This type of conflict of interests between professional players on the financial 
markets are natural and exist in numerous areas of the markets. They become especially 
apparent in the rating market because of the lack of balance of power between the different 
players. Issuers are relatively weak compared to the CRAs because of their dependence on the 
ratings they get. Investors have not historically invested large resources in improving rating 
agencies' behaviour because of CRAs insufficient transparency on its operations. This meant 
that CRAs historically have a very strong position. What the IOSCO Code is trying to do is to 
rebalance the interests between the different players."
18   
 
Rousseau (2005), sums up concern over the resulting “accountability gap” as follows:  (i) this 
accountability gap is worrisome for CRAs as well as market participants; (ii)  for the former, 
the accountability gap may affect their credibility in the marketplace; and (iii) for the latter, it 
is of particular concern given the role that CRAs play in capital markets. There is a need for a 
mechanism to take over if reputation fails.
19  
 
For the first time in the history of ratings in the United States, the Credit Rating Agency 
Reform Act of 2006 has clearly designated the SEC to monitor CRAs' compliance with new 
securities laws and regulations.  The SEC will be able to act as deemed necessary, study and 
report to congressional committees any problems faced in the future in all matters related to 
the credit rating industry. 
 
                                                       
18 CESR’s technical advice to the European Commission on possible measures concerning credit rating 
agencies ( March 2005: 51, para 260). 
19 Rousseau S (2005: 37).   16 
VI. Conclusions 
 
CRAs play a key role in financial markets by helping to reduce the informative asymmetry 
between lenders and investors, on one side, and issuers on the other side, about the 
creditworthiness of companies (corporate risk) or countries (sovereign risk). CRAs' role has 
expanded with financial globalization and has received an additional boost from Basel II 
which incorporates the ratings of CRAs into the rules for setting weights for credit risk.   
 
In making their ratings, CRAs analyse public and non-public financial and accounting data as 
well as information about economic and political factors that may affect the ability and 
willingness of a government or firms to meet their obligations in a timely manner. However, 
CRAs lack transparency and do not provide clear information about their methodologies.     
 
Ratings tend to be sticky, lagging markets, and then to overreact when they do change. This 
overreaction may have aggravated financial crises in the recent past, contributing to financial 
instability and cross-country contagion. Moreover, the action of countries which strive to 
maintain their rating grades through tight macroeconomic policies may be counterproductive 
for long-term investment and growth.   
 
The recent bankruptcies of Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat have prompted legislative 
scrutiny of the agencies. Criticism has been especially directed towards the high degree of 
concentration of the industry, which in the United States has reflected a registration and 
certification process in the form of NRSRO designation biased against new entrants.  The 
effect of such concentration has been the absence of the discipline enforced by competition 
and a low level of innovation. 
 
In the United States, policy action has included the 2006 Credit Rating Agency Reform Act 
which has overhauled the regulatory framework by prescribing procedural requirements for 
NRSRO registration and certification and by strengthening the powers of the SEC.   
 
At international level, the main initiative has been the publication by IOSCO of its Code of 
Conduct.  This Code aims at developing governance rules for CRAs to ensure the quality and 
integrity of the rating process, the independence of the process and the avoidance of conflict 
of interest and greater transparency. In its 2005 Technical Advice to the European 
Commission on possible Measures Concerning Credit Rating Agencies, the CESR 
recommended the implementation of the IOSCO Code and adoption of a "wait and see" 
attitude. 
 
Definitive assessment of these initiatives would still be premature. The industry will receive a 
fillip from implementation of Basel II. The major CRAs will undoubtedly seek a substantial 
share of the new business which will result. Promotion of competition may require policy 
action at national level to encourage the establishment of new agencies and to channel 
business generated by new regulatory requirements in their direction. Regulatory action at the 
national level may also be necessary to ensure that the agencies operate in accord with levels 
of accountability and transparency matching the recommendations of the IOSCO Code.   17
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ANNEX 2  
Rating symbols 
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Members of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
Belgium      T  T       T  T  T  5 
Canada  T T  T  T    T  T  6 
France  T  T T T    T T    T T T 9 
Italy      T T T    T
1     T T T 7 
Japan     T  T  T  T  T  T  T  7 
Luxembourg       T       T  T    3 
Netherlands  T  T T T    T T    T T T 9 
Sweden       T       T  T    3 
Switzerland    T  T           T  T  T  T  6 
United Kingdom  T
1   T
1   T
1  T      T
1    T
1   T
1  T  T    T
1  10 
United  States      T  T       T  T  T  5 
Total  BCBS  4  5  7 11 1  6  4  2 11  11 8 70 
Interesting non-members of the BCBS 
Argentina      T  T        T  T  4 
Australia T
1   T
1    T
1  T      T
1    T
1 T
1  T  T    T
1  10 
Chile    T  T        T  T  T  5 
Hong  Kong  (China)       T    T  T  T  T  5 
Total  non-BCBS  1  2 2 4 0 1 2 1 3 4 4  27 
Total  5  7 9  16  1 6 6 3  15  16  12  
 
 
Source: BCBS (2000, Table 2: 46). 
Notes:   1.  Table 2 shows the rating agencies recognized by the banking supervisors in BCBS  
    countries and selected non-members. The total number of agencies recognized in each  
    country is shown in the right hand column. It is evident there is considerable disparity in 
    the number of recognitions granted by supervisors. The big three CRAs: (i) Moody's; 
    (ii) Standard and Poor's; and (iii) Fitch are recognized by all BCBS members and 
    and almost all non-BCBS countries shown.  
  2.  This table was done before the merger of Duff and Phelps with Fitch. 
 
   22 
REFERENCES 
 
Ammer J and Packer F (2000). How Consistent are Credit Ratings? A Geographic and 
Sectoral Analysis of Default risk, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
International Finance Discussion Papers, Number 668, June. 
BCBS (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision) (2000). Credit Ratings and 
Complementary Sources of Credit Quality Information, Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision Working Papers, No. 3, Basel, August. 
Beers D and Cavanaugh M (2005). Sovereign Credit Ratings: A Prime; Ratings Direct, New 
York, Standard & Poor's, September. 
Beers D and Chambers J (2004). Sovereign Defaults Set to Fall Again in 2005, Standard and 
Poor's, Ratings Direct, September. 
Beers D (2004). Credit FAQ: The Future of Sovereign Credit Ratings, Standard and Poor's, 
London, March. 
Berg A and Catherine P (1999). Are Currency Crises Predictable? IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 46, 
June. 
Bhatia AV (2002). Sovereign Credit Ratings Methodology: an Evaluation. IMF Working 
Paper 02/170, IMF. 
BIS (Bank for International Settlements) (2006). Quarterly Review, June. 
Blum J and Hellwig M (1995).The macroeconomic Implications of Capital Adequacy 
Requirements for Banks, European Economic Review, 39(3). 
Borio CEV;   Furfine M  and  Lowe P (2001). Pro-cyclicality of the Financial System and 
Financial Stability: Issues and Policy options, BIS Papers no. 1, March. 
Borensztein E;  Cowan K and Valenzuela P (2006). The Sovereign Ceiling Lite and Bank 
Credit Ratings in Emerging Markets Economies, mimeo, Inter-American 
Development Bank, Washington, DC, USA, Banco Central de Chile, Santiago, Chile. 
Borensztein E and Panizza U (2006). The Cost of Sovereign Default, working paper, Inter-
American Development Bank, Washington D.C, United States of America. 
Brand L and Bahar R (1999). Ratings Performance 1998, Standard & Poor's Corporation. 
Cantor R and Packer F (1996).  Determinants and impact of sovereign credit ratings.  
Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Vol. 2, October. 
Cantor R and Packer F (1995). Sovereign Credit Ratings, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
Current Issues in Economic and Finance, Vol. 1, no.3, June. 
Cantor R and Packer F (1994). The Credit Ratings Industry, Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York  Quarterly Review, Summer/Fall. 
CESR (2005). CESR's Technical Advice to the European Commission on Possible Measures 
Concerning Credit Rating Agencies.The Committee of European Securities 
Regulations, ref: CESR/05-139b. 
Claessens S and Embrechts G (2002). Basel II, sovereign Ratings and Transfer Risk: External 
versus Internal Ratings, University of Amsterdam and Rabobank International, the 
Netherlands for presentation at the conference Basel II: an Economic Assessment, 
Bank for International Settlements, Basel, May 17-18. 
Cornford A (2005).Basel II: The Revised Framework of June 2004, UNCTAD Discussion 
Paper no.178, April. 
Cornford A (2001). The Basel Committee's Proposals for Revised Capital Standards: Mark 2 
and The State of Play, UNCTAD Discussion Paper no.156, September. 
Daly; Kevin and Daria F (2006). Sovereign Ratings History since 1975, Ratings Direct, 
Standard and Poor's, April. 
Egan-Jones Ratings Company (2002). Statement of Egan-Jones on Credit Rating Agencies to 
the SEC,10 November Estrella, A., (2000),  Credit Ratings and Complementary 
Sources of Credit Quality Information, Basel Committee On Banking Supervision, 
Basel, Switzerland, Working Papers, No. 3, August. 
Ferri G (2003).  More Analysis: Agencies Invest Enough in Less Developed Countries, 
University of Bari.   23
Ferri G; Liu L-G and Majnoni G (2000). The Role of Rating Agency Assessments in Less 
Developed Countries: Impact of the Proposed Basel Guidelines, University of Bari. 
This paper is available at http://siteresources  The World Bank 2000, 
worldbank.org/INTABCDEWASHINGTON2000/Resources/ferri_et al.pdf. 
Ferri G; Liu L-G and Stiglitz J (1999). The Pro-cyclical Role of Rating Agencies: Evidence 
from the East Asian Crisis, Economic Notes by Banca Monte dei Paschi di sienata 
SpA, Vol. 28, no.3. 
Fitch Ratings (2006). Fitch Sovereign Rating Transition and Default Study, Special Report, 
23 February. 
Goldstein M; Kaminsky GL and Reinhart CM (GKR) (2000). Assessing Financial Stability: 
an Early Warning System for Emerging Markets,  Institute for International 
Economics, Washington DC. 
Haque NU; Mathieson D and Mark N (1998). The relative importance of Political and 
Economic Variables in Creditworthiness Ratings, IMF Working Paper, WP/98/46. 
Haque NU; Mathieson D and Mark N (1997). Rating the Raters of Country Creditworthiness, 
Finance & Development, IMF, March . 
Haque NU; Kumar M; Mathieson D and Mark N (1996). The Economic Content of Indicators 
of Developing Country Creditworthiness, IMF, Staff Papers, Vol. 43, no. 4, 
December. 
HR 2990 (2006).  An Act, To Improve Ratings Quality by Fostering Competition, 
Transparency, and Accountability in the Credit Rating Agency Industry, United 
States House of Representatives, 109th Congress, 2nd Session. 
HR 2990 (2005). Reforming Credit Rating Agencies: The SEC's Need for Statutory 
Authority, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and 
Government Sponsored Enterprises of the Committee on Financial Services, United 
States House of Representatives, 109th Congress, 1st Session, Serial No. 109-66, 
April 12.  
HR 2990  (2005). The Credit Rating Agency Duopoly Relief Act,  Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises 
of the Committee on Financial Services, United States House of Representatives, 
109th Congress, 1st Session, Serial No. 109-66, November 29. 
IMF (1999). International Capital Markets: Developments, Prospects on key Policy Issues, 
September 1999. This paper is available at   
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/icm/1999/index.htm. 
IOSCO (2003). IOSCO Statement of Principles Regarding the Activities of Credit Rating 
Agencies, Statement of the Technical Committee of IOSCO, Report on the Activities 
of Credit Rating Agencies, Report of the Technical Committee of IOSCO, Document: 
IOSCOPD153, September. 
IOSCO (2003). Report on Analyst Conflict of Interest, Report of the Technical Committee of 
IOSCO, Document: IOSCOPD152. 
IOSCO (2003). IOSCO Statement of Principles Regarding The Activities of Credit Rating 
Agencies, Statement of the Technical Committee of IOSCO, Document: 
IOSCOPD151. 
Japan Center for International Finance (1999). Characteristics and Appraisal of Major Rating 
Companies, Focusing on Ratings in Japan and Asia, April. 
Juttner and McCarthy (2000). Modelling a Rating Crisis, Sydney, Australia, Macquarie 
University, unpublished. 
Kaminsky G and Schmukler SL (2002). Emerging Markets Instability: Do Sovereign Ratings 
Affect Country Risk and Stock Returns? World Bank Economic Review, Oxford 
University Press, Vol. 16(2), August. 
Kaminsky GL; Reinhart C and Vegh C (2004). When it Rains, it Pours: Pro-cyclical Capital 
Flows and Macroeconomic Policies, NBER Working Paper No. 10780. 
Kaminsky GL and Reinhart C (1999). The Twin Crises: The causes of Banking and Balance-
of-Payments Problems, American Economic Review, 89(3), June.   24 
Kaminsky G; Lizondo S and Reinhart CM (1998). Leading Indicators of Currency Crises, 
Staff Papers, International Monetary Fund, Vol. 45, March. 
Larrain G; Reisen H and Von Maltzan J (1997). Emerging Market Risk and sovereign Credit 
Ratings, OECD Development Centre Technical Papers no.124, Paris, April.  
Lehmann A (2004).Sovereign Credit Ratings and Private Capital Flows to Low-income 
Countries, African Development Review 16 (2). 
  Liu LG and Ferri G (2001). How do Global Credit Rating Agencies Rate Firms from 
Developing Countries?, ADB Institute Research Paper no.26. 
Millon MH and Thakor AV (1985). Moral Hazard and Information Sharing: A Model of 
Financial Information Gathering Agencies, Journal of Finance 40.  
Martin M and Rose-Innes C (2004). Private Capital Flows to Low-Income Countries: 
Perception and Reality, Chapter 2 of Canadian Development Report 2004. 
Moody’s Special Comment (2003). Are Corporate Bond Ratings Pro-Cyclical, Moody’s 
Investors Service, October 2003. 
Moody's (2001). Revised Country Ceiling Policy: Rating Methodology, June. 
Moody's Special Comment (1998). White Paper: Moody's Rating Record in the East Asian 
Financial Crisis, Moody's Investors Service, May. 
Mora N (2005). Sovereign Credit Ratings: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt,  Mimeo, 
American University of Beirut.  
Nagy PJ (1984).Country Risk: How to Assess, Quantify, and Monitor it?, Euromoney 
publications, London.  
Packer F and Reynolds E (1997). The Samurai Bond Market, Current Issues in Economic and 
Finance, June. 
Powell A (2004). Basel II and Developing Countries: Sailing Through the Sea of Standards, 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3387, September. 
Ramakrishnan RTS and Thakor AV (1984). Information Reliability and a Theory of Financial 
Intermediation, Review of Economic Studies 51. 
Reinhart CM (2002). Default, Currency Crises and Sovereign Credit Ratings, NBER WP 
8738. 
Reisen H (2002). Ratings since the Asian Crisis, United Nations University, Discussion Paper 
no. 2002/2. 
Reisen H and Von Maltzan J (1999). Boom and Bust in Sovereign Ratings, OECD Technical 
Papers no.148 ,www.oecd.org/pdf/M00006000/M00006204.pdf. 
Rousseau S (2005). Enhancing the Accountability of Credit Rating Agencies: The Case for A 
Disclosure-Based Approach, CMI, University of Montreal. 
Sachs J; Tornell A and Velasco A (1996). Financial Crisis in Emerging Markets: the Lessons 
from 1995, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity:1, (Washington: Brookings 
Institution. 
Setty G and Dodd R (2003). Credit Rating Agencies: Their Impact on Capital Flows to 
Developing Countries, Financial Policy Forum, Special Policy Report no.6. 
Smith R and Walter I (2001). Rating Agencies: Is there an Agency Issue?, Stern School of 
Business, New York University. 
Standard and Poor's and UNDP (2005). Sovereign Ratings in Africa, September 2005. 
Sy A (2004). Rating the rating agencies: anticipating currency crises or debt crises? In: 
Cantor, R, (Ed.), Recent Research on Credit Ratings (special issue), Journal of 
Banking and Finance 28 (11). 
Varma P; Richard C; David H; David L; Sharon O and Vincent T (2003). Sovereign Bond 
Defaults, Rating Transitions, and Recoveries (1985-2002), Moody's Special 
Comment, February. 
White LJ (2001). The Credit Rating Industry: An Industrial Organization Analysis, paper 
presented at the Conference on The Role of Credit Reporting Systems in the 
International Economy, The World Bank, Washington D.C., 1-2 March. 
World Bank (2006). Global Development Finance: The Development Potential of Surging 
Capital Flows, The World Bank.   25
 
UNCTAD DISCUSSION PAPERS 
No. Date  Author(s)  Title 
185  July 2007  Robert Howse  The concept of odious debt in public 
international law 
184  May 2007  André Nassif  National innovation system and macroeconomic 
policies: Brazil and India in comparative 
perspective 
183  April 2007  Irfan ul Haque  Rethinking industrial policy 
182  October 2006  Robert Rowthorn  The renaissance of China and India: implications 
for the advanced economies 
181  October 2005  Dr. Michael Sakbani  A re-examination of the architecture of the 
international economic system in a global 
setting_ issues and proposals 
180  October 2005  Jörg Mayer and Pilar 
Fajarnes 
Tripling Africa’s Primary Exports: What? How? 
Where? 
179  April 2005  S.M. Shafaeddin  Trade liberalization and economic reform in 
developing countries: structural change or de-
industrialization? 
178  April 2005  Andrew Cornford  Basel II: The revised framework of June 2004 
177  April 2005  Benu Schneider  Do global standards and codes prevent financial 
crises? Some proposals on modifying the 
standards-based approach  
176 December 
2004 
Jörg Mayer  Not totally naked: textiles and clothing trade in a 
quota free environment 
175  August 2004  S.M. Shafaeddin  Who is the master? Who is the servant? Market 
or Government? 
174  August 2004  Jörg Mayer  Industrialization in developing countries: some 
evidence from a new economic geography 
perspective 
173  June 2004  Irfan ul Haque  Globalization, neoliberalism and labour 
172  June 2004  Andrew J. Cornford  The WTO negotiations on financial services: 
current issues and future directions 
171  May 2004  Andrew J. Cornford  Variable geometry for the WTO: concepts and 
precedents  
170  May 2004  Robert Rowthorn and  
Ken Coutts 
De-industrialization and the balance of payments 
in advanced economies 
169  April 2004  Shigehisa Kasahara  The flying geese paradigm: a critical study of its 
application to East Asian regional development 
168  February 2004  Alberto Gabriele  Policy alternatives in reforming power utilities in 
developing countries: a critical survey   26 
No. Date  Author(s)  Title 
167 January  2004  Richard  Kozul-Wright 
and  Paul Rayment 
Globalization reloaded: an UNCTAD Perspective 
166  February 2003  Jörg Mayer  The fallacy of composition: a review of the 
literature 
165  Nov. 2002  Yuefen Li  China’s accession to WTO: exaggerated fears? 
164  Nov. 2002  Lucas Assuncao and  
ZhongXiang Zhang  
Domestic climate change policies and the WTO 
163  Nov. 2002  A.S. Bhalla and S. Qiu  China’s WTO accession. Its impact on Chinese 
employment 
162  July 2002  Peter Nolan and Jin 
Zhang 
The challenge of globalization for large Chinese 
firms 
161  June 2002  Zheng Zhihai and  
Zhao Yumin 
China’s terms of trade in manufactures,  
1993–2000 
160  June 2002  S.M. Shafaeddin  The impact of China’s accession to WTO on 
exports of developing countries 
159  May 2002  Jörg Mayer, Arunas  
Butkevicius and Ali 
Kadri 
Dynamic products in world exports 
158 April  2002  Yılmaz Akyüz and  
Korkut Boratav 
The making of the Turkish financial crisis 
157  Sep. 2001  Heiner Flassbeck  The exchange rate: Economic policy tool or 
market price? 
156  August 2001  Andrew J. Cornford  The Basel Committee’s proposals for revised 
capital standards: Mark 2 and the state of play 
155  August 2001  Alberto Gabriele  Science and technology policies, industrial 
reform and technical progress in China: Can 
socialist property rights be compatible with 
technological catching up? 
154  June 2001  Jörg Mayer  Technology diffusion, human capital and 
economic growth in developing countries 
153  Dec. 2000  Mehdi Shafaeddin  Free trade or fair trade? Fallacies surrounding the 
theories of trade liberalization and protection and 
contradictions in international trade rules 
152  Dec. 2000  Dilip K. Das  Asian crisis: distilling critical lessons 
151  October 2000  Bernard Shull  Financial modernization legislation in the United 
States – Background and implications 
150  August 2000  Jörg Mayer  Globalization, technology transfer and skill 
accumulation in low-income countries 
149  July 2000  Mehdi Shafaeddin  What did Frederick List actually say? Some   27
No. Date  Author(s)  Title 
clarifications on the infant industry argument 
148 April  2000  Yılmaz Akyüz  The debate on the international financial 
architecture: Reforming the reformers 
146  February 2000  Manuel R. Agosin and 
Ricardo Mayer 
Foreign investment in developing countries: 
Does it crowd in domestic investment? 
145  January 2000  B. Andersen, Z. Kozul- 
Wright and R. Kozul-
Wright 
Copyrights, competition and development: The 
case of the music industry 
144  Dec. 1999  Wei Ge  The dynamics of export-processing zones 
143 Nov.  1999  Yılmaz Akyüz and 
Andrew Cornford 
Capital flows to developing countries and the  
reform of the international financial system 
142 Nov.  1999  Jean-François 
Outreville 
Financial development, human capital and  
political stability 
141  May 1999  Lorenza Jachia and 
Ethél Teljeur 
Free trade between South Africa and the 
European Union – a quantitative analysis 
140  February 1999  M. Branchi, A. 
Gabriele and 
V. Spiezia 
Traditional agricultural exports, external 
dependency and domestic prices policies: African 
coffee exports in a comparative perspective 























Copies of  UNCTAD Discussion Papers may be obtained from the Publications Assistant, Macroeconomic 
and Development Policies Branch (MDPB), Division on Globalization and Development Strategies 
(DGDS), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Palais des Nations, CH-1211 
Geneva 10, Switzerland (Fax no: (4122) 917 0274/Tel. no: (4122) 917 5896). New Discussion Papers are 
accessible on the website at http://www.unctad.org. 
 